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International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict |
Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, USA |
Defiance is based upon the fact that people commonly make threats that they are unwilling or unable to carry out. The word we use for this in the United States is "bluffing"--pretending to have the ability and willingness to do something that you really do not have the ability to do. In cases where the threatening party is bluffing, the threatened party can often successfully resist by defying the threat or "calling the opponent's bluff." For example, if a government threatens to arrest everyone who participates in a protest march, organizers of the march might conclude that the government does not have the political will (nor the police forces) to jail hundreds of thousands of protesters. So they may "call the government's bluff" by marching anyway, and forcing the government to admit that they cannot do anything about it. Or, workers might threaten a lengthy strike, but employers might conclude that the workers do not have the resources needed to do without paychecks for an extended period. They could challenge the workers to a strike, assuming that they would, in actuality, quickly give in. Or, the international community might threaten military action against the government which is committing genocide against its own citizens. However that government might decide that the international community is unwilling to follow through on the threat because it does not want to spend the money or risk the casualties of an enforcement action.
Parties who engage in the bluff-calling or defiance need to recognize that they are placing the threatening party under enormous pressure. If the threatening party does not back up its threat, then it is likely to reduce its ability to use threat-based strategies in the future. As a result, defiance often leads to an all-out confrontation.
Deterrence, Counter-Threats (and Arms Races)
Misunderstanding the Relationship Between Threat and Force
Failure to Anticipate Opponent Reactions and the Backlash Effect
Copyright ©1998 Conflict Research Consortium -- Contact: crc@colorado.edu