Brockner , Joel and Rubin, Jeffrey Z .. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1985. Pp. 246-248.
The US involvement in El Salvador corresponds to the process of entrapment. First, the Reagan administration was committed to defending the El Salvador government against the Communist-backed guerillas. Second, the El Salvador government forces were doing poorly in military struggle with guerilla warriors. Third, despite that, the US commitment only escalated.
At the beginning of the conflict it was obvious that a quick victory was impossible. Thus, the US government had to supply a lot of resources to keep the conflict going. The decision to back up the El Salvador government was not popular either in the US or abroad. It is common for decision makers who adopt failing policy in the face of opposition to develop stronger commitment to it. In addition, for the newly elected American president and his administration, it was a matter of face-saving and showing strength.
The US military advisors in El Salvador knew that it would have to be a long commitment: ". . . in a counterinsurgency [anti-guerilla] war there are no big military victories, only slow cumulative advances, and the economic assistance and social reform . . . are just as important as battlefield gains" (p. 247). As in all entrapment situations, this demanded a periodic supply of resources. This, in turn, created the perception that too much had been invested in the conflict, making it harder for the US government to quit. In 1984, the Reagan administration decided to triple its military assistance for El Salvador.
Theoretically, to prove entrapment there should be evidence of the failure of the chosen policy and of continuing investment justifying past commitments. This evidence is present in the case of US involvement in El Salvador: the El Salvador army lacked enough manpower to defeat guerillas, and it was demoralized. It is harder to prove the second proposition. Although in 1984, the New York Times wrote that there was pressure on the president from Congressional leaders to show them that his course of action in El Salvador was working.
Summary by Mariya Yevsyukova
Use the "back" button to return to the previous screen.
Copyright ©1998 Conflict Research Consortium -- Contact: crc@colorado.edu